The crew advised the agent of their estimated arrival time and fuel request. Radio readability between FAB6560 and the CYRB terminal controller was poor, and the CYRB terminal controller advised the crew to try again when a few miles closer.Īt 1629, the crew contacted the First Air agent at CYRB on the company frequency. At 1627:09, the FO subsequently called the CYRB terminal controller and provided an ETA of 1643 and communicated intentions to conduct a Runway 35 approach. The crew initiated the pre-descent checklist at 1624 and completed it at 1625.Īt 1626, the crew advised the NAV CANADA Edmonton ACC controller that they were leaving FL260. FAB6560 commenced descent from F元10 at 1623:40 at 101 nm from CYRB. The crew were also advised to anticipate calling the CYRB terminal control unit after leaving FL270, and that there would be a layer of uncontrolled airspace between FL270 and FL200. At 1623:29, the NAV CANADA Edmonton ACC controller cleared FAB6560 to descend out of controlled airspace and to advise when leaving FL270. Footnote 7 A military terminal control unit at CYRB was to handle airspace from 700 feet above ground level (agl) up to FL200 within 80 nm of CYRB.Ĭommencing at 1622:16, the FO made 3 transmissions before establishing contact with the NAV CANADA Edmonton Area Control Centre (ACC) controller. The crew were planning to transition to an ILS/DME Footnote 6 RWY 35 TRUE approach (Appendix C) via the MUSAT waypoint.Ī temporary military terminal control area (MTCA) had been planned, in order to support an increase in air traffic at CYRB resulting from a military exercise, Operation NANOOK. The crew and dispatcher jointly agreed that the flight would continue to CYRB.Īt 1616, the crew programmed the global positioning systems (GPS) to proceed from their current en-route position direct to the MUSAT intermediate waypoint on the RNAV (GNSS) Footnote 5 Runway (RWY) 35 TRUE approach at CYRB (Appendix B), which had previously been loaded into the GPS units by the crew. The crew and dispatcher discussed deteriorating weather conditions at CYRB and whether the flight should return to CYZF, proceed to the alternate CYUX, or continue to CYRB. Radar data show that FAB6560 entered the Northern Domestic Airspace (NDA) 50 nautical miles (nm) northeast of CYZF, approximately at RIBUN waypoint (63° 11.4′ N, 113° 32.9′ W) at 1450.ĭuring the climb and after leveling at F元10, the crew received CYRB weather updates from a company dispatcher (Appendix A). The first officer (FO) occupied the right seat and was designated as the pilot not flying (PNF).īefore departure, First Air dispatch provided the crew with an operational flight plan (OFP) that included forecast and observed weather information for CYZF, CYRB, and CYUX, as well as NOTAM (notice to airmen) information. The captain occupied the left seat and was designated as the pilot flying (PF). In each instance, the material has been carefully examined to ensure that the extracts used are related to the causes or contributing factors of this accident or to the identification of safety deficiencies. In this report, the TSB has made extensive use of the CVR recording. Unless the CVR material is required to both support a finding and identify a substantive safety deficiency, it will not be included in the TSB's report. The TSB has always met its obligations in this area and has restricted the use of CVR data in its reports. ![]() The reason for protecting cockpit voice recorder (CVR) material lies in the premise that these protections help ensure that this essential material is available for the benefit of safety investigations. While the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) may make use of any on-board recording in the interests of transportation safety, it is not permitted to knowingly communicate any portion of an on-board recording that is unrelated to the causes or contributing factors of an accident or to the identification of safety deficiencies. Canada complies with this requirement by making cockpit voice recordings privileged in the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Convention on International Civil Aviation, Annex 13, Footnote 1 requires States conducting accident investigations to protect cockpit voice recordings.
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